Tipaimukh Dam : a real concern for Bangladesh

The role of the Bangladesh government in this matter is quite confusing. Despite the rising protests from all corners, the government seems to be undermining the threats posed by the construction of this dam.

BY CONSTRUCTING the Tipaimukh Dam India is only looking into its own interest. India wants to control the water flow to facilitate irrigation of the Cacher plain. India is not at all concerned with its consequences on Bangladesh. Constructing this dam, the cubic metres of water which will be stopped is not clearly stated by the Indian government. The Indian high commissioner to Bangladesh is giving new information on a regular basis regarding the Tipaimukh Dam. According to the high commissioner, Bangladeshi journalists are making much ado about nothing. Bangladeshi journalists are writing from their nationalist point of view. The saddest part of the whole issue is that India never bothered to discuss the matter of the Tipaimukh Dam with Bangladesh. The water resources minister has recently disclosed in the parliament that Tipaimukh Dam is not like the Farraka barrage. By constructing this dam India will not divert water of the river Barak. It seems both the Indian high commissioner and our water resource minister are of the same opinion.

Bangladesh would have to face serious consequences if this dam is constructed. Even the people of Manipur and Nagaland would also have to suffer. The Barak-Surma-Kushiara is an international river. Therefore, Bangladesh, being a lower riparian country, has the right to an equitable share of the water from the river and also a right to examine the details of the construction of this dam. No detailed plan of the dam has seemingly been provided to Bangladesh to appraise its full impact on Bangladesh. India, being an upper riparian country, has an obligation under international law to discuss the construction of such a massive infrastructure on the common river with lower riparian Bangladesh.
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rofessor Mustafizur Rahman Tarafdar, a water resources expert, in an article titled ‘Tipaimukh Dam: An alarming venture’, discussed the ill-effects of the Tipaimukh Dam. If this dam is eventually constructed as intended, Bangladesh would have to suffer the adverse effects. This dam would lead to hydrological drought and environmental degradation. The dam would cause the Surma and Kushiara to run dry during November to May which would eventually hamper agriculture, irrigation, navigation, shortage of supply of drinking water, etc. This shortage of water in these few months would decrease the boost of groundwater which over the years would lower the groundwater level, which in turn would affect all dug outs and shallow tube-wells. Agriculture, which is dependent on both surface as well as groundwater, would also be affected. Also, any interference in the normal flow of water in the Barak would have an adverse effect on the Surma in Bangladesh that, in turn, feeds the mighty Meghna that flows through Bangladesh. This dam would hamper the cultivation of early variety of boro in the northeast. Arable land will decrease and production of crops will fall, leading to an increase in poverty. Roughly 7 to 8 per cent of total water of Bangladesh is obtained from the Barak. Millions of people are dependent on hundreds of water bodies fed by the Barak in the Sylhet region for fishing and agricultural activities. A dam-break is a catastrophic failure of a dam which results in the sudden draining of the reservoir and a severe flood wave that causes destruction and in many cases death downstream. If the Tipaimukh Dam were to break, impounding ‘billions’ of cubic metres of water, it will cause catastrophic floods because of its colossal structure.

According to an article published by Dr. Soibam Ibotombi, teacher of earth sciences at Manipur University, the northeastern part of India is one of the highest earthquake-prone areas in the world due to its tectonic setting, i.e. subduction, as well as collision plate convergence. Analysis has revealed that hundreds of earthquakes have taken place in this region in the last 100-200 years. Study on the trends of earthquakes reveals that earthquakes mostly take place in regions which have experienced earthquakes in the past. The Tipaimukh Dam site has been chosen at the highest risk seismically hazardous zone. Inhabitants of Manipur also believe that this dam would prove to be a grave threat to the flora and fauna and endangered species like pythons, gibbons, herbal and medicinal plants, and for tribal land rights. They also fear that the dam would submerge as many as 90 villages within a 311 square-kilometre radius.

Renowned water expert Dr Ainun Nishat has recently observed that construction of Tipaimukh Dam will not bring any benefits to Bangladesh. Similar concern is also being raised by another water expert SI Khan. Both of them suggested that government should have a serious discussion with the Indian government. Till the end of the discussion, Bangladesh must request India to refrain from any sort of construction of the dam in the proposed site. According to these two experts, if the dam is constructed, 16 districts of greater Sylhet will be affected. The immense natural disaster that will take place would be irreversible. Even though the Indian government is saying once the dam is constructed, electricity will be generated and Bangladesh will benefit by importing the electricity. It does not make sense to make a certain part of Bangladesh a desert area solely for the purpose of importing electricity [Dainik Destiny, May 31].

The ever-increasing demand for freshwater has propelled the construction of dams and barrages on international rivers, and it is reported that 60 per cent of the world’s largest rivers have been interrupted by artificial structures. Many of them were built in agreement with riparian countries, and about 200 treaties are now in force for the management of common water resources.

According to a UNESCO study, freshwater is getting scarce. The study reveals that the average supply of water is expected to fall by one-third within 20 years. Nearly seven billion people could face water shortages by 2020, and global warming may cause severe water shortages in 50 countries. South Asia is one of the regions to be adversely affected, partly because of melting of the Himalayan glaciers due to global warming.

In 1896, the then US attorney general Judson Harmon propounded the ‘Harmon Doctrine’ which stated that Mexico was not entitled to the water from an international river, the Rio Grande. The doctrine emphasised territorial sovereignty over an international river. It means that, within its territory, a state can do whatever it wishes with the water of an international river, and does not need to bother about the consequences of its withdrawal on a lower riparian nation. But the US discarded and discredited it in 1906 when it concluded a treaty with Mexico relating to sharing of water of the Rio Grande. India also argued in favour of this doctrine in the mid-1970s with Bangladesh. India also made a treaty with Pakistan in 1960 called the Indus Water Treaty, which gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the Eastern Rivers and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan.

A river flows as an indivisible unit, without knowing any political boundaries. If it is interfered with at the upper stream, the lower riparian country will be affected. That is why international law recognises the right of each riparian country to benefit from all the advantages deriving from river waters for the welfare and economic prosperity of its people. According to international law, it is illegal to construct any dam on an international river without consent from the other side. But India has violated it by starting the construction of Tipaimukh Dam on the Barak. News of this construction has been formally confirmed in a recent statement by Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, the high commissioner of India to Bangladesh. He admitted that the Indian government has resumed the process of construction once again from the end of 2008. According to Chaktavarty, the dam would produce hydroelectricity and would not ‘harm’ Bangladesh in any way. It would only regulate the river’s flow. As it is a project aimed at producing hydroelectricity, no water would be withheld from Bangladesh. To produce electricity the water flow would have to be obstructed which means that there will be less flow of water to the riparian neighbouring country. Furthermore, he is stating that the water will not be used for irrigation purposes. But, once the water is obstructed the water flow will automatically decrease. Sadly, such assurances were given at the time of the construction of the Farakka Dam also but till date, Bangladesh is suffering the consequences.

Unilateral water diversion, or withdrawal of water from international or common rivers, has been the long-standing policy of India. India has seldom bothered to think about the impact of such policies on a lower riparian country, such as Bangladesh, in diverting water from common rivers.

Ever since India began constructing the Farakka Barrage on the India-Bangladesh border in 1972, 17 rivers in Bangladesh have already ‘died’ and another eight are on the verge of drying up due to reduced water flows. The navigable length of the river in south-eastern Bangladesh has also reduced due to low water volume. A number of tributaries have either dried up or have become too shallow for vessels to use. The low river flow has increased salinity which in turn has caused loss of vegetation. Industries in south-western Bangladesh face the problem of getting usable, saline-free water. The cost of Bangladesh’s direct losses due to Farakka is estimated at half a billion dollars a year. According to studies conducted by Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon, about 80 rivers in Bangladesh have dried up within three decades after the Farakka Dam was built.

India is withdrawing waters of almost all the common rivers by building dams on the upstream, which will eventually cause Bangladesh to turn into a desert. The Padma River is drying up in Rajshahi after construction of Farakka Barrage. Twenty tributaries of the river have turned into streamlets.

The Tipaimukh Dam is not just a political issue but also a scientific one. The livelihoods of millions of people, who rely on the Meghna for freshwater, for their livelihoods, and for the overall food security of the region, are at stake. Bangladesh is already battling with water shortages due to global warming and consequent climate change. The Tipaimukh Dam would add to the environmental cataclysm already predicted by environmentalists.

The role of the Bangladesh government in this matter is quite confusing. Despite the rising protests from all corners, the government seems to be undermining the threats posed by the construction of this dam. Only recently the prime minister of Bangladesh has said the government intends to form a committee to evaluate all aspects regarding construction of the dam before making any decisions on this controversial project. It might be that the government is envisaging some benefits from the construction of this controversial dam, namely import of electricity. In April 2009, the Indian government had invited a Bangladeshi delegation to see the construction of the planned Tipaimukh Dam on the Barak.

The Bangladesh government must take a stand to clarify its position on the Tipaimukh Dam, on the basis of scientific evidence and expert opinion and not on the basis of mere assurances of the Indian government. There is evidence of the reluctance of the Indian government to fulfil its commitments in the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, in which Bangladesh in recent years has been receiving significantly less water than promised. The Indian government has not made any response even after repeated official protests by Bangladesh on the issue of water shortfalls. Therefore, it is imperative that the Bangladesh government re-examine the scientific evidence on the possible ill effects of the Tipaimukh Dam before it signals its approval.

Digital Bangladesh : virtual dreams, real lives

An elusive project to transform Bangladesh needs an infusion of resources, leadership and village-centred development if it is to be made meaningful, says Delwar Hussain. (This article was first published on 30 April 2009) About the author Delwar Hussain is a working for a PhD at the London School of Economics. It is a familiar cycle in democracies: as post-election euphoria fades and a new government faces a myriad of problems, ambitious projects whose announcement injected some life into the campaign start to lose their sheen. Delwar Hussain is a researcher on Bangladeshi society Also by Delwar Hussain inopenDemocracy: "Bangladeshis in east London: from secular politics to Islam" (7 July 2006) "Islamism and expediency in Bangladesh" (11 January 2007) "Life and death in the Bangladesh-India margins" (13 January 2009) Will this be the fate of "digital Bangladesh"? The Awami League (AL) won a major victory in the election of 29 December 2008 in part by offering this transformative vision - a claim on the future, a commitment to make Bangladesh a modern, technologically sophisticated and networked country by the time of the fiftieth anniversary of its independence, 2021. The notion was prominent in the AL leader, Sheikh Hasina's campaign rhetoric. But what, if anything, is the substance behind the slogan? "Digital Bangladesh" shares with all good political slogans a malleable, reverberative quality. The details of what it might entail have always been sketchy. Sheikh Hasina'sspeeches during huge election rallies offered meagre clues amid the jargon and soundbites. At one gathering on 16 December, she announced: "the Awami League-led grand alliance has set the vision 2021 for the youth. We want to build a ‘digital Bangladesh' where people will get a developed life, free from crime and misrule and [able to] face the challenges of the 21st century." This was different from what I had envisaged: fishermen being able to throw computerised nets into rivers which would digitally calculate which fish were old enough to catch and which too young. It is an attractive vision, but where does the "digital" come in? After all, a country "free from crime and misrule" will be guaranteed not by any digital fix but by a society which values justice and is governed by politicians of integrity (and who do not have millions of dollars in overseas bank accounts). Perhaps another of Sheikh Hasina's speeches is more enlightening. At a meeting in Bangladesh's capital on 26 December, she said: "Bangladesh should be developed and emerge with dignity in the global arena. We will make Dhaka a modern city free of criminal activities, traffic congestion and outages of power, water and gas, and we'll improve communication with other parts of the country." She continued: "We will build a developed country full of possibilities and free of poverty, where all will have access to healthcare and education. There will be food security, so no one is deprived of food. The challenges of the 21st century will be faced boldly." Again, the aspiration is hard to fault. But the puzzle remains: there's no mention of e-government, computerised schools that do not require teachers, or boats that row themselves during the annual floods. This may sound cynical. But in a country where electricity is as intermittent as girls from poor homes being able to complete their full high-school education, the proclaimed "digital Bangladesh" already had the whiff of a vote-catching election gimmick. After the Awami League's decisive victory, I emailed the new government asking for more information about the initiative. So far, there has been no response. "Digital Bangladesh" is working in one respect, however: there are jokes. A farmer sets off for the market to buy a cow. On the way, he meets a friend who tells him that he can buy one on a mobile-phone. The farmer calls the number and hears an automated message: "For cows press 1. For goats press 2. For chickens press 3." The farmer presses 1. "For Bangladeshi cow press 1. For foreign cow press 2." He presses 1. "For black cow press 1. For brown cow press 2. For white......" The line is disconnected: the farmer has used up all the credits on his phone. The new Bangladesh still has a way to go. In fact, however, many in Bangladesh do believe that there is something to the "digital Bangladesh" notion. The slogan may yet lack actual substance, but people want it to become more than a virtual dream. The political notion has found a social echo that in post-election Bangladesh will not yet allow its promise to disappear. The cellular hope The most enthusiastic supporters of the project are to be found on the social-networking site Facebook. The approximately 4,000 members of the "digital Bangladesh" group - almost all middle-class, urban-based and educated - are in varying degrees engaged by the idea of the country becoming technologically advanced. Saiful is one. He writes that the "promise of a 'digital Bangladesh' has created renewed hopes in the government and the public equally, particularly for the young generation [ ]. Bangladesh can be the next destination of the IT generation all over the world. This campaign is like another War of Liberation, giving the country a real chance for a digital evolution." Ismail writes: "Digital Bangladesher shopno amra dekhchhi - we can see the dream of ‘Digital Bangladesh‘". Mustafa says: "recently I visited some villages and talked to young housewives.... I was surprised to note that they are absolutely conscious about the future of their children's education. Even they think that their kids should know how to use computers". But these young proponents of the cause are realistic. They ask how a digital Bangladesh is possible when there are regular power-cuts even in the major city-centres, and hold the government responsible for such failings; say that the general development of the country is hampered by pervasive corruption that is most visible in local and central government; and question where the money will come from. Most raise the issue of low literacy levels, and the consequence of the rural poor being left out of any kind of development. Engr, for example, asks: "What will ‘Digital Bangladesh' deliver? Is it important to [the] 80% underprivileged people of Bangladesh?...‘Digital Bangladesh' will be Frankenstein. Only 10-15% will take the opportunity and will deprive others using [the] ‘Digital Bangladesh' outcomes." The comments and questions are impressive. But reading them left me no better informed. Here as elsewhere, there is very little actual explanation of the scope of "digital Bangladesh": its mission and goals, and a clear statement of how these will be achieved. The modern vision Hafiz Siddiqi is the vice-chancellor of one of the largest private universities in Dhaka. He considers "digital Bangladesh" to be an extremely ambitious plan - and one with immense potential. He believes it will allow the country to become more efficient, transparent, and commercially more productive. The project in his view is about establishing an integrated Information and Communication Technology (ICT) network with education at the heart that could push Bangladesh towards the status of a middle-income country. This means building on and extending existing e-governance, e-commerce, e-banking, and mobile-phone network capacities. The universities are partly digitised already, all colleges, high schools, primary schools and madrasas will be wired with third-generation technology by 2021. "After five years of schooling, all students should have regular access to computers with internet facilities. The use of the automated library is spreading slowly in most universities, although they have to go a long way to be digital in the real sense". Hospitals, clinics, and healthcare services at all levels will also be connected electronically. This will mean that medical reports can be analysed in Dhaka, and recommendations and prescriptions for patients sent back to a village (perhaps hundreds of miles away) in a matter of minutes. In the tricky area of governance, communication between those making the decisions and those employed to implement them will become faster and more effective. The monitoring of performance will be built in. For the first time, there will be an easy flow of information between ministries, administrative offices at district levels, right down to the village. Siddiqi acknowledges that to realise the aspirations of the 2021 vision, the country must be able to produce its own engineers, scientists and technological know-how. This means more investment in education. If this doesn't happen, Bangladesh will be dependent and vulnerable. "If we fail to manage a sustainable digitised Bangladesh with our own resources, ‘Digital Bangladesh' 2021 will harm rather than benefit the country." The village voice Bangladesh begins at the village level, far from the places where most university professors and Facebook users live. It is people living in rural areas who delivered victory to Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League. If "digital Bangladesh" is ever to be implemented, the rural inhabitants must be part of it and the government must make every effort to ensure this. Many Bangladeshis living far from urban centres don't have electricity or clean drinking-water, and even face the prospect of dying in the bed they were born in after a life that has left them more impoverished than their parents. Also on Bangladesh inopenDemocracy: Farida Khan, "Getting real about globalisation in Bangladesh" (15 April 2004) Naila Kabeer, "The cost of good intentions: 'solidarity' in Bangladesh" (24 June 2004) Liz Philipson, "Bangladesh's fraying democracy" (26 June 2006) Farida Khan, "Muhammad Yunus: an economics for peace" (25 October 2006) Timothy Sowula, "Bangladesh's political meltdown" (24 November 2006) Firdous Azim, "Women and religion in Bangladesh: new paths" (19 December 2007) Jalal Alamgir, "Bangladesh: a verdict and a lesson" (13 February 2009) Liz Philipson, "Bangladesh: revolt and fallout" (30 March 2009) I visited a village that is eight hours' drive from the capital. A primary class is being held in the courtyard of the local mosque as there is no school here as such. When I arrive, around thirty 4- and 5-year-olds, arranged in rows and sitting cross-legged on the ground, are learning the English alphabet. The children are hardly dressed; none wears sandals. They share a few books, which are covered in old election posters. The teacher, also bare-footed, is an elderly bearded man wearing a purple shirt and white hat. He is actually a rice farmer, but teaches the class a few times a week. He uses a stick - an extension of his finger - to poke dozing kids and tap the shoulders of the chatty ones. There are more girls here than boys, a proportion that will be reversed when the children are about 13. I join the class at the letter H. "H diye house", the teacher says. "H diye house", the class repeats with enthusiasm. You can hear the joy of learning something weird and new in their shrill voices. "House holo ki?" ["What is a house?"], the teacher asks. He answers himself. "House holo basha." The kids repeat the words. "Who lives in your house?" he asks. The children shout out various responses: "my mum", "granddad", "uncle's wife", "my dad's cows", "our ducks". All of this takes place in Bangla. They move onto the letter I. "I diye ice-cream". "Ice-creamholo ki?" the teacher asks. "Ice-cream holo ice-cream" the pupils answer. Some are surprised that "ice-cream" is the same in English and Bangla. "Ice-cream is bad for you" the teacher cautions. "You will get aches in your bellies if you eat too many of them". The class looks unconvinced. Onto J. "J diye jug. Jug holo jug". Now the kids are laughing. This English thing is easy - they're mostly Bangla words! Two girls take the opportunity to sneak to the back, where there are taps used by the men of the village for ablution before prayers. The girls turn a tap on and stick their mouths to it. Dripping with water, they rejoin the class. "Water is very important", the teacher is telling the class, unaware he has two returned absconders. "If you don't drink enough water, you die. If you drink too much water, you also die. You have to drink the right amount. Only a little this way, or that way, and you will die". The teacher adds: "this is how Allah has made the world. He has told us about benefits and detriments. He wants you to follow those things that are beneficial to you and to avoid that which will be detrimental". The class is interrupted by the call for the lunchtime prayers. The kids all run home for their rice. I ask the teacher (in English) what he thinks of "digital Bangladesh". He has no idea what I am saying. I try Bangla. He smiles and says he's never heard of it. I ask him whom he voted for in the election. It's not rude to ask here: almost everything in such places is party-politicised, and this kind of information is common knowledge to most anyway. He says, the boat - the symbol of the Awami League. I try to explain "digital Bangladesh" to him. From what he is able to grasp, he thinks it's a good idea. He would like computers for his students. He thinks they will really benefit from them. But he would like a school building first, some books and pens even. A fan for the hot season would also be good, as would be a lightbulb. The brave new world "Digital Bangladesh" in its current iteration would benefit the urban middle classes and could bring significant progress. But this should not be at the expense of other provisions, which must be a priority in any event: including rural schools (chairs and tables and books and pens and fans and lightbulbs and all), as well as other essential services the rural poor have been denied for so long. The two types of project are not mutually exclusive, nor need they be in competition with each other. In fact, a successful "digital Bangladesh" would need a more literate population. A mass computer-literacy programme or even a government-sponsored computer course, offered perhaps as an incentive for every student who completes his or her secondary-school education, would benefit everyone. If there is will - backed by investment - there is a way. The signs are mixed. The new government blocked access to the video-sharing internet site YouTube after the posting there of a recording of army officers berating Sheikh Hasina over the deaths of their colleagues in the Bangladesh Rifles mutiny on 25-26 February 2009 (see Liz Philipson, "Bangladesh: revolt and fallout", 30 March 2009). The recording was quickly reposted to other internet sites via proxies - a technique developed by cyber-dissenters in China. Such behaviour - reflecting the wider political culture of control and personalism that has handicapped the country since independence - casts doubt over the government's integrity vis-à-vis "digital Bangladesh". Insofar as it has substance, the 2021 vision carries hopes for a different approach: more democracy, transparency, and accountability - ideals that successive Bangladeshi governments have eroded and treated as anomalies. A meaningful "digital Bangladesh" would start at the top: effective websites forgovernment departments, departmental financial accounts published online, citizens' direct email access to public representatives, the voting record of every MP open to scrutiny. Such a "digital Bangladesh" would help to change the political culture for the better. If combined with essential social-development programmes that bring measurable improvements to Bangladesh's rural inhabitants, the result would be a major advance for the country. Are Bangladesh's leaders willing to rise to the challenge?

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Bangladesh Facebook users

Most interesting is the statistics of Asia, especially India & Bangladesh:

While India has about 60 million internet users only 200,000 of them use Facebook. Whereas about 100,000 Bangladeshis use Facebook out of a total number of internet users of only 500,000 (some claim it is 1 million).

Here is a graph showing the growth of Bangladesh internet users (source)


According to the above stats every one among five Bangladeshi internet users has a Facebook account.

Farakka to Tipaimukh

IN RECENT days, Bangladesh seems to have woken up to the danger posed by construction of the Tipaimukh Dam in the neighbouring Manipur state of India. There are some in Bangladesh who have a habit of translating national issues of this kind into deplorable partisanship thereby fostering disunity when national unity is needed. In so doing they commit acts of treason.


Before delving into the Tipaimukh project, I would like to share some facts surrounding the Farakka Barrage. Although the construction of the Farakka Barrage was completed during the Mujib rule in 1974-5, the decision to build this dam can be traced back to 1951. In those days, hydroelectric dams were popular methods to generating electric power. India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan planned on building hundreds of hydropower dams from rivers that flowed down from the Himalayas. The Farakka dam was built to divert water from the Ganges River into the Hooghly River during the dry season (January to June), in order to flush out the accumulating silt which in the 1950s and 1960s was a problem at the major port of Kolkata on the Hooghly River. A series of negotiations between the Pakistani and Indian governments failed to persuade India into abandoning the Farakka project.


After Bangladesh’s independence, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission met over 90 times to discuss the Farakka Barrage issue, but without any results. The Bangladesh team was headed by BM Abbas. In April 1975, Bangladesh agreed to a trial operation of the Farakka Barrage for a period of 41 days from April 21 to May 31, 1975 to divert 11,000-16,000cfs (cusecs) with the understanding that India will not operate feeder canal until a final agreement was reached between India and Bangladesh on the sharing of Ganges water. Bangladesh was assured of getting 40,000 cusecs during the dry season. 


Unfortunately, soon after Sheikh Mujib’s assassination in August 15, 1975, taking advantage of the political change in Bangladesh, India violated the agreement (MoU) by cheating and diverting the full capacity of 40,000 cusecs unilaterally. The matter was brought to the attention of UN General Assembly, which on November 26, 1976 adopted a consensus statement directing the parties to arrive at a fair and expeditious settlement. On November 5, 1977 the Ganges Waters Agreement was signed, assuring 34,500 cusecs for Bangladesh. The five-year treaty expired in 1982 and after several shorter extensions lapsed entirely in 1989. The JRC statistics shows very clearly that Bangladesh did not get its due share during all those years (1977-91). There was no improvement of the situation during the first Khaleda Zia administration (1991-96) with average water share reduced to 10,000 to 12,000 cusecs, with one extreme event of only 9,000 cusecs, during the dry season.


After Sheikh Hasina was elected prime minister, she visited India and signed a treaty with her counterpart Deve Gowda on December 12, 1996. The treaty addressed the heart of the conflict: water allocation (35,000 cusecs) during the five months of the dry season (January-May). During the rest of the year, there is sufficient water that India can operate the Farakka diversion without creating problems for Bangladesh. The treaty stipulated that below a certain flow rate, India and Bangladesh will each share half of the water. Above a certain limit, Bangladesh will be guaranteed a certain minimum level, and if the water flow exceeds a given limit, India will withdraw a given amount, and the balance will be received by Bangladesh (which will be more than 50 per cent).


The statement of IK Gujral, external affairs minister, in Rajya Sabha on December 12, 1996 on the visit of prime minister of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh to India and the signing of the treaty on the sharing of Ganges water at Farakka reads: ‘[D]uring the critical period within the lean season, i.e. from March 1 to May 10, India and Bangladesh each shall receive a guaranteed flow of 35,000 cusecs of water in an alternating sequence of three 10-day periods each. This is aimed at meeting the fundamental requirements of both our countries through a just and reasonable sharing of the burden of shortage. The Treaty also has the merit of being a long-term arrangement combined with scope for reviews at shorter intervals to study the impact of the sharing formula and to make needed adjustments. While the Treaty will be for 30 years and renewable on mutual consent, there is a provision of mandatory reviews at the end of 5 years and even earlier after 2 years with provisions for adjustments as required. Pending a fresh understanding after the review stage, Bangladesh would continue to receive 90 per cent of its share in accordance with the new formula. We would thus avoid a situation where there is no agreement on the sharing of the Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh… As the House would recall, we have already taken initiatives in the commercial sphere by extending tariff concessions to Bangladesh on a range of products of export interest to them. We propose to extend commercial credits of Rs. 1 billion to enhance trade relations further.’


In the light of the above facts, it is difficult to sustain accusations that the 1996 Treaty went against the interest of Bangladesh, becoming a fait accompli. I have never heard an intelligent person say that a treaty signed with the aim of getting fair and equitable share is worse than not having one. Was the 1977-treaty silly, too? More outrageous is the implied assertion by some that the AL government that had ruled only five years in the post-Mujib era of 34 years is solely to be blamed for all the maladies facing Bangladesh today, including the Tipaimukh Dam, soon to be constructed by India.


It is true though that India had not kept its side of the bargain since signing of the treaty. The Joint River Commission statistics, as quoted by Syful Islam in the New Nation, March 9, shows that in 1999 Bangladesh got 1,033 cusecs of water at Teesta barrage point against its normal requirements of 10,000 cusecs of water. After JRC meeting in 2000 the water flow rose to 4,530 cusecs, in January 2001 it reduced to 1,406 cusecs, in January 2002 to 1,000 cusecs, in January 2003 to 1,100 cusecs, in November 2006 to 950 cusecs, in January 2007 to 525 cusecs and in January 2008 to 1,500 cusecs.


India’s behaviour mimics those of Israel in dishonouring every treaty that the rogue state had signed with the Palestinian Authority. Should not it be ashamed of its iniquity?


Let’s now look at the disastrous effect of the Farakka Barrage on Bangladesh. The immediate effects have been (1) reduction in agricultural products due to insufficient water for irrigation; (2) reduction in aquatic population; (3) river transportation problems during dry season; (4) increased salinity threatening crops, animal life drinking water, and industrial activities in southwest Bangladesh. The long-term effects, which are already being felt, include: (a) one fourth of the fertile agricultural land will become wasteland due to a shortage of water; (b) 30 million lives are affected through environmental and economical ruin; (c) an estimated annual economic loss of over half a billion dollars in agricultural, fisheries, navigation and industries; (d) frequent flooding due to environmental imbalance and changes in the natural flow of the Ganges. A BSS report of 2004 stated that over 80 rivers of the country dried up during last three decades due to the construction of the Farakka barrage on the Indian side of the river Ganges.


Bridge and Husain, researchers in Kansas, USA, have identified Farakka as the root cause behind arsenic poisoning with groundwater in Bangladesh and West Bengal State of India.


As to its impact in India, the South Asian Network on Dams, Rivers and People report (November 1999) to the World Commission on Dams is quite revealing. It says, ‘Farakka Barrage Project taken up for the resuscitation of the navigational status of the Port of Calcutta has resulted in massive devastation in Malda on its upstream and Murshidabad on its downstream in West Bengal. Huge sedimentation, increasing flood intensity and increasing tendency of bank failure are some of its impacts. Erosion has swept away large areas of these two districts causing large scale population displacement, border disputes with Bihar and Bangladesh, pauperisation and marginalisation of the rural communities living by the river and creation of neo-refugees on the chars.’ 


So, it is clear that even the supposed beneficiary – the state of West Bengal – did not benefit from the project. Farakka Barrage has rightly been termed by some environmentalists as the greatest man-made eco-disaster of our time. If we had imagined Farakka was the last of such criminal calamities imposed on Bangladesh, we are wrong.
 Syful Islam mentions a study conducted by the ‘International Rivers’, a US-based NGO that protects rivers and defends the rights of communities, which revealed that India had already built 74 dams, Nepal 15, Pakistan 6 and Bhutan 5 in the Himalayan region in the recent years. It also found that 37 Indian, 7 Pakistani and 2 Nepalese dams were under construction in that area. The study also identified that India had planned to build 318 dams, Nepal 37, Pakistan 35 and Bhutan 16 to add over 1,50,000MW of additional electricity capacity in the next 20 years. With 4,300 large dams already constructed and many more in the pipeline, India is one of the world’s most prolific dam-builders. India is committed to building more than 100 dams in eight states of the north-east corner alone. 


If these numbers are true, it is important that the current government issues a white paper disclosing actions taken, if any, by past and present governments to stop India from such projects that are going to be built on international rivers harming Bangladesh.


Let’s now look at Tipaimukh. Manipur needs about 140MW of power to fulfil the unrestricted demand at the peak hours (1700 hrs to 2200 hrs). The total availability of power from all the central sector plants located in Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura comes to around 105MW. The Tipaimukh Dam plan, built on the river Barak, which bifurcates into two streams as it enters Bangladesh as the rivers Surma and Kushiara, has been on the drawing board for nearly 40 years. According to the implementing agency, North Eastern Electric Power Corporation, this 390-metre-long, 163-metre-high dam would have an installed capacity of 1,500MW. As a multipurpose project, the dam also aims at flood moderation, improving navigation, irrigation and aquaculture in the region. Efforts were made in the past to get the World Bank or JBIC (a Japanese development bank) to back the project, but their involvement is still elusive. It is costing India Rs 6,800 crore — an escalation from the earlier estimated expenditure of Rs 5,163 crore. The foundation stone of the Tipaimukh project was laid by India’s union minister for industries and Cachar’s representative in the Lok Sabha, Sontosh Mohan Dev, along with other central ministers, on December 16, 2006. According to a NEEPCO source there, the work in January of 2007 mainly dealt with underground drilling at the reservoir site of the project. The Brahmaputra Board, a wing of the union water resources ministry, drilled those sites in 1997. 


The proposed dam is unpopular in the Manipur state where it is being constructed. Experts there have rightly termed it a geo-tectonic blunder of international dimensions. The Indian government’s decision to construct the Tipaimukh Dam in north-east India is not only arrogant but also criminal to the core. It will have lasting devastating impact in the entire region. It will adversely affect millions of Bangladeshis living down south in the north-east corner of the country, weakening their means of livelihood, forcing them to become internally displaced and thereby worsening Bangladesh’s overall economy. It will harm bilateral relationship between the two neighbouring countries. Bangladeshi people have already suffered miserably from the Farakka Barrage and cannot afford to see another one built to threaten them.


Our experience in the past 50 years has also taught us that humanity has brought more harm than good by challenging the natural course of rivers. Manmade systems like hydroelectric dams have failed to wipe out famine and hunger. More people have become poor than rich, which often time is concentrated amongst the very few that are involved with construction project. As Arundhati Roy has once said about dams, ‘They’re a guaranteed way of taking a farmer’s wisdom away from him. They’re a brazen means of taking water, land and irrigation away from the poor and gifting it to the rich. Their reservoirs displace huge populations of people, leaving them homeless and destitute. Ecologically, they’re in the doghouse. They lay the earth to waste. They cause floods, water-logging, salinity, they spread disease. There is mounting evidence that links Big Dams to earthquakes.’


What really concerned this writer the most is the stupidity of the Indian government’s decision to go ahead with hydroelectric dams to meet its electric demand. This decision seems too short-sighted, too irresponsible, and can only antagonise people on either sides of the border. If India cares about meeting energy needs in the north-eastern corner it would better serve the interest of its people by choosing the nuclear alternative. India has several nuclear power plants that are operating in various parts of India. It is inconceivable that it cannot afford to build one extra plant in the north-east corner of the country to meet its energy demand. 


Again, I want to know: what did the previous administrations in Bangladesh do about this dam? How is the new government planning to deal with this issue? What can conscientious human beings of our planet do to stop India from building dams that kill people? 


As hinted earlier, the very people targeted for drawing the benefits of the Tipaimukh dam living in the Manipur State had long been fighting a losing battle to stop this project. It is highly unlikely that demonstrations and protests inside Bangladesh would push India to abandon the project now, especially after spending hundreds of crores of rupees in front end loading activities. 


While we are critical of Indian government’s decision to construct dams that produce devastating results affecting tens of millions of people, we have to be self-critical of our own failure to bring world attention to the gargantuan harm that India’s Farakka has already brought upon Bangladesh. If we had succeeded in that endeavour, India today wouldn’t be building the Tipaimukh dam. Whether we like it or not, we must realise that self-interest rules the day. In our world, there are no permanent friends or enemies. We are continuously reminded that what is permanent is self-interest and that has to be pursued vigorously. That says a lot about moral bankruptcy of a world that we live in and share with our neighbours in which might is increasingly becoming right, and the powerless has no effective means to fight against powerful enemies and nations that prey upon them. 


At this stage, what actions and programmes are meaningful for Bangladesh? Can India be persuaded to abandon dam projects on international rivers in favour of alternative options for energy need? Given India’s long history of dishonouring its agreements on Farakka with Bangladesh, can it be trusted for keeping any new promise? Are the UN and/or the ICJ only options Bangladesh has to redress its grievances? 


Tea Plantation Workers in Bangladesh

Tea Plantation History

History of Bangladesh tea industry dates back to around 1823 when tea started to be grown for commercial purposes in the Assam forests. Tea plantation in Bengal developed concurrently with that in the northeastern part of India during the early nineteenth century. In 1855, the Assam indigenous tea plant was established in Chandghani Hills of Sylhet.Near about the same time, wild tea was found among Khasiand Jainta Hills. Around 1840, tea plantation started in Chittagong. The first commercial tea plantation was established in 1857 in Mulnichera in Sylhet.

At present, the total number of tea estates are 163 and the total number of tea factories are 114. The total garden area is 115,629.76 ha. The tea is a huge source of revenue for the government of Bangladesh.(www.teaboard.gov.bd)

Tea is a very popular drink for the people all over the world. We all go to the market,buy packets of tea,come back home, make them and drink them,simple.But have you ever wondered where this tea comes from? At what cost do we get to drink this tea? Have you ever wondered about the tea plantation workers and the lives that they lead?

Origin of the Tea Workers

Most of the tea estates are located in the northeast region of Bangladesh. The first tea garden was established by the Duncan Brothers. Since then all the tea gardens have been established by clearing jungles. Those who did the jungle clearing were non-locals brought by Duncan from Assam, Bihar, Madras, Orissa and other places in India.

Back home they were told that they would arrive at a “lovely garden in the hill country where they would look after trees with leaves of pure gold which would fall if you (they) shook them” (Jones 1986:11).

After they settled in this unknown country they realised that the story of the golden leaves was a lie and it remains a mystery to them till date.

The tea worker with different ethnic identities are people who are less-talked-of and forgotten. They are not well aware of their origins. Their lives in Bangladesh are confined to the tea gardens and they do not interact much with people of other ethnic identities. They do not speak their language perfectly and most of them are illiterate.

As they are a socially excluded group, they are a very easy target for exploitation by the profiteers from the tea industry.

Tea-The Industry

Tea is an important export item in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh ranks tenth among the ten largest tea-producing and exporting countries in the world. In the year 2000, the country’s tea production was 1.80% of the 2,939.91 million kg produced worldwide.

Most of the 163 tea estates in Bangladesh are located in the North-eastern region of Bangladesh-Maulvi Bazar, Hobiganj, Sylhet, Brahmanbaria districts. There are a few number of tea estates in Panchagar District and in Chittagong,a South-eastern district.

Owners of tea gardens include both foreign and local companies. While four Sterling companies own 27 estate, Bangladeshi companies and individuals own the rest of the tea gardens. The four foreign companies are James Finlay, Duncan Brothers, Deundi Tea Company and The New Sylhet Tea Estate.

All the 163 tea estates are managed by five different categories of management:

(i) Sterling companies

(ii) National Tea company

(iii) Bangladesh Tea Board

(iv) Bangladeshi Private Limited Companies

(v) Bangladeshi Proprietors

The estates are categorised into three according to their production capacities. They are:

1. Category A: All the ‘A’ category estates that have the highest productivity belong to the British companies (fully or partially).
2. Category B: The Bangladeshi government, Bangladeshi tea companies or Bangladeshi individuals own this category of estates.
3. Category C: The family owned small and low productive estates belong to this category. Wages and working conditions are at their worst in the tea estates under this category.

Tea Workers in Captive Situation

In 1854 when the tea workers (Santals, Oraons,Munda etc.) from different states of India first arrived they each signed a four-year contract that eventually obliged them to remain on the tea gardens for generations. That was the beginning of hard labour, erosion of cultural identity and captivity that never came to an end. Illiterate, they didn’t understand what the document contained when they signed it. This ignorance led to a life full of suffering for them and for their children.

A century later, they still find themselves illiterate. Their poor housing conditions, low wages, long working hours, social discrimination, and de facto restriction on free movement deprive thwm of many basic human needs and rights that every human being must have for personal and societal progress. These conditions make sure that the children of tea workers can do nothing else but become tea workers. Deprived, exploited and alienated the tea workers live an inhumane life.

Dependency

The tea workers are so much cornered that they depend solely on the companies for food, medicine, accomodations, education, etc. They do not have choices about their life and amenities. That is because they do not have a social standing in Bangladesh.

The only social relationship that exists between the tea workers and the Bengalis is one of business. The Bengalis own majority of the shops in the area. On the weekly holiday,Sunday, some of the tea workers work in Bengali houses. But the Bengalis would hardly allow them into their houses. They treat them as untouchables. Glasses, plates, or other equipment are generally kept separate for the tea workers. However, among themselves whatever their identity or origin, the tea workers maintain quite good relations.

Language

The tea workers are completely cut off from their origins in India. They can only partly recall the languages of their forefathers. They speak “a sort of distorted Hindi” that passes as a common language on the tea estates. They also speak in Deshali, which is a mixture of Bengali and language of Orissa. Their accents while speaking in Deshali testify their cultural corrosion.

Relationship of Tea Workers With Managers

Social and economic distance of the tea workers with their Bengali supervisors including the managers is much wider. Francis Rolt, a British writer, gives a vivid description of the severe discriminatory conduct of the hierarchy towards the tea workers: “the tea gardens are managed as an extreme hierarchy: the managers live like gods, distant, unapproachable, and incomprehensible. Some even begin to believe that they are gods, that they can do exactly what they like.”

“Managers have anything up to a dozen laborers as their personal, domestic servants. They are made to tie the managers shoe lace, to remind them that they are under managerial control and that they are bound to do whatever they are asked,” writes another British human rights activist, Dan Jones.

Are there any constitutions to protect the tea workers?

The condition of the forlorn tea workers depict many kinds of abuse, discrimination and deprivation that are very difficult to overcome. There are constitutional safeguards,laws and mechanisms intended to ensure human dignity, but for the tea workers human dignity is only a dream. Their conditions violate the maximum provisions of the Bangladesh Constitution, different instruments, laws and rules that commit social, economic and human dignity. The SAARC Social Charter, in the hands of the South Asian States, upholds the same commitment. It’s implementation is a big challenge indeed.

Living Conditions of the Tea Workers and the SAARC Social Charter

“We live in place worse than that of the officers’ pets (at the estates). Many of us have only a thin jute mattress to sleep on,” describes a tea worker about her living condition. Living conditions provided to tea workers are generally outrageous and clear infringement of the Bangladesh Constitution. One committment that the SAARC Social Charter sets for the South Asian States is to enable its citizens “satisfy basic human needs and to realise his or her personal dignity, safety and creativity.”

The Social Charter also touches upon the “access to basic education, adequate housing, safe drinking water and sanitation, and primary health care”, which should be guaranteed in legislation, executive and administrative provisions, in addition to ensuring “adequate standard of living, including adequate shelter, food and clothing”.